Country
Morocco
Two principal services — DGED (foreign) and DGST (domestic) — both reporting to the King through the Ministry of the Interior, with substantial documented Pegasus-spyware deployments against domestic and foreign targets.
The Kingdom of Morocco's intelligence community is anchored by two principal services. The Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation (DGED) is the foreign intelligence service. The Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire (DGST) is the domestic security service. Both report to the King through the Minister of Interior, with operational autonomy that places them — within the Moroccan administrative framework — substantially closer to the Royal Cabinet than to the day-to-day Government.
The Moroccan services operate as a regional intelligence hub for North Africa and have established working relationships with Western and Gulf services on counter-terrorism. The post-2010 period has produced sustained international attention to Moroccan use of NSO Group's Pegasus spyware against domestic journalists, opposition figures, and a substantial set of foreign targets — including, in the July 2021 Pegasus Project consortium reporting, Moroccan-attributed targeting of senior French Government officials and President Emmanuel Macron's personal phone. The Moroccan Government has consistently denied use of Pegasus.
Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire
Morocco's domestic security service, responsible for counter-intelligence, counter-terrorism, and substantial domestic political-surveillance functions.
Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation
Morocco's foreign intelligence service, established in 1973 with a particular focus on the Western Sahara conflict, regional Maghreb relations, and Moroccan diaspora communities.
How to read a country page
This is the institutional landscape of Morocco's intelligence apparatus as it is documented in the public record. Each card above links through to a full agency profile — the service's founding date, statutory basis, jurisdiction, parent ministry, headquarters, official channels, and a structured account of role, history, and notable operations footnoted to primary sources. The agencies on this page may overlap institutionally (a foreign-intelligence service and a signals-intelligence service often share missions and personnel) and may operate against one another in counter-intelligence terms; the country page does not impose a hierarchy among them, only an inventory.
If a particular operation or scandal is what you are looking for rather than the institutional background, see the Dossiers — long-form pieces that cross agencies and countries. The methodology page documents how operations are categorised as confirmed, alleged, or disputed, and what the public record can and cannot tell us. The Lexicon defines the terms that recur across these pages — HUMINT, SIGINT, covert action, plausible deniability, station, asset, finding.
Coverage here grows as new declassifications expand what can responsibly be said about services that remain partly closed. Some agencies have full reference entries; others are stub entries pending the full treatment. Stubs are kept on the index so navigation between related services is preserved while the detailed text is written.